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COLLOQUIUM
The lightness of existence 
and the origami of “French” 
anthropology
Latour, Descola, Viveiros de Castro, 
Meillassoux, and their so-called  
ontological turn
Michael M. J. Fischer, Massachusetts Institute  
of Technology
Latour turns to Wittgensteinian or Lyotardian language games, and Silversteinian deixis and 
metapragmatics, as formal means of distinquishing modern European discursive categories 
and institutions, each defined by three criteria: the right pre-position, discontinuity from 
other language games, and felicity conditions. Double-click and the snake of knowledge are 
metaphorical reminders to not efface the labor of invention and maintenance. In lectures 
on Gaia, Latour turns toward a Durkheimian politics of the Anthropocene. Descola charts 
Siberian and North American groups on a north–south historical gradient from animism 
to analogism, and Amazonian cultural groups as animist transformational sets, reviving a 
human geography tradition, connecting to Latour’s project through wide-mesh networking 
of human–nonhuman cosmo-logical modes and relations, and contesting Viveiros de 
Castro’s uniform Amazonian predation cosmology and multinaturalism–uniculturalism, 
supporting the earlier work on contrastive Amazonian linguistics. We need not celebrate 
“humanity as technological detour,” but focus on the “peopling of technologies.” 
Keywords: Descola, digital humanities, language games, Latour, Viveiros de Castro 
An earlier version of these remarks was delivered as part of “The ontological turn in French 
philosophical anthropology,” an executive session of the AAA Annual Meeting, Chicago, 
November 23, 2013.
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Tricksters and philosophers
Out of the Latourian bag of tricks comes this time a meditation on language 
games—on Wittgenstein (1953) and Lyotard ([1983] 1988), on J.  L. Austin 
(1953) and William James (1890)—“deamabulatory theories of truth,” as Latour 
delightfully cites William James (Latour 2013a: 78). Latour’s meditation comes 
with some surprising co-responses or correspondences located in rhythmic re-
prises or repetitions and constants across language games: these are his struggles 
against disenchantment (Max Weber, e.g. 1922 [1968]) and toward a peculiar 
(even parochial) European feeling of discrimination: it is fair game he repeat-
edly laments to criticize Christianity but not other language games. We need 
thus, he suggests, an anthropology of Whites like him, of Moderns like him, who 
purify and purify their language games only to find themselves disenchanted, 
nostalgic for (Freud might say gently) childhood church melodies, or catacous-
tics, as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1998) calls the tunes in one’s head that keep 
coming back. 
Philippe Descola provides a counterpoint, and we must thank him for the oc-
casion to think again with the pre-Moderns, whatever that means, for here La-
tour–Wittgenstein–Lyotard–Austin–and–James warn us to be careful about our 
pre-positions, our prepositions, marks of perspective and positioning. Descola 
provides occasion to think again with the Achuar, at a time when we are begin-
ning to have a number of breakthrough new ethnographies of Amazonia. I think 
here particularly of Lucas Bessire’s work with the Paraguyan Ayoreo People-from-
the-Place-Where-the-Collared-Peccaries-Ate-Our-Gardens (Bessire 2012, 2013, 
2014); of Eduardo Kohn’s work with the Runa of Ecuador (Kohn 2013); and that 
brilliant Yanomami text by Davi Kopenawa, translated and annotated by Bruce 
Albert (Kopenawa and Albert 2013), which begins with a very contemporary eco-
logical call wrapped in an ancient anaconda or harpy eagle’s skin, “The forest is 
alive. The white people (the ghosts, those who speak strange languages) persist in 
destroying it. We are dying one after another, and so will they. In the end, all of 
the shamans will perish and the sky will collapse. . . . You must hear me—time is 
short” (vii). 
Descola plays one of the language games of the Latourian Moderns, typolo-
gizing, looking for essential schemas, composed of identifications and relations, 
that are at best heuristics, and at worst impositions of a fourfold logic box, cross-
sectioned with multiplicities of relationship typologies. Some of these crossings 
are gestures to contemporary sciences—cognitive science, neuroscience, evolu-
tionary psychology, and sociobiology—logical universal potentials and schemas 
that can be actualized by anyone but are dominant in archipelagoes of contrast-
ing types—animists in the Amazon, totemists in Australia, analogists in Siberia 
and in Foucault’s Renaissance Europe (Foucault [1966] 1971), and naturalists in 
Latour’s parable Europe. I say parable or even fictive Europe (parables and fictions, 
Latour himself insists, are important sine-qua-nons of contemporary science), be-
cause all the Moderns named—Descartes, for instance—were not in fact Moderns 
by Latour’s definition, but are only constructions of a pedagogical or logic language 
game, straw men, reductio ad absurda. Descartes, of all people, an experimental-
ist vivisectionist and anatomist who was prouder of those experiments than of his 
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speculative philosophy, composed his notions of the pineal gland, of res extensa, 
and so on, post facto, to heuristically knit together a plausible and temporary ex-
planation of what he was finding—conjectures and refutations (not ontologies).1 
Descola delightfully reminds us of Lévi-Strauss’ distinction between hot and 
cold societies (e.g. Lévi-Strauss [1962] 1966): Descola says (one can feel Lévi-
Strauss, his mentor, smiling) that naturalist ontologies are machines for multiply-
ing hybrids, while animisms and totemisms are machines for preventing hybrids 
from further multiplying. 
And so two friends, Latour and Descola, who quote and praise each other, build 
a French gift-exchange social bond, even as their projects seem quite different, al-
most chiastic: with a philosophe-theologian at one end and an ethnographer-eth-
nologist at the other. The philosophe styles himself as a female ethnographer of a 
mythical form of life called the Moderns or sometimes the Modernization Front 
(like the Popular Front), but is mostly an ethologist and engineer determined to 
clear his networks of people, subjects, and individual actors, as well as of nouns 
that become hypostasized metaphysical Leviathans like God, Reason, and Society; 
but with a return in the end to religious feeling. Meanwhile the ethnographer of the 
Amazon is styled an ethnologist, rising to the status of philosophe and cosmologist. 
Their meeting ground is their common hypostatization of a limited number of 
modes of existence—four in one case, twelve to fifteen in the other—that they can 
tabulate on charts just like other engineers (in the AIME project with 175 crossings 
or hyperlinks on a webpage2). But while one insists on a Principle of Irreduction 
and Free Association, the other insists on binary axes of distinction producing logic 
boxes that are at best Geimasian and thus open to transformational development in 
analogical, animistic, totemic, and naturalist directions.
Metaphysics and ontology
As long as we are playing language games (and how can we not?), I wonder what 
we would lose if we dispensed with the words metaphysics and ontology, much like 
the Oulipo author Georges Perec’s three-hundred-page novel, A void, a lipogram 
written without an “e” (Perec [1969] 1994). Actually I think we would lose nothing 
except obfuscation. 
“Meta-physics” is what—usually (but not only) in language—is errant, escapes 
closure or definition. “Ontology” similarly—at least for Heidegger (a largely so-
lipsistic, not an anthropologically or social analysis-friendly philosopher), and 
Sartre—is that which is split and dialectical between, for instance, what is on-
tic or phenomenological and what is onto-logical or beyond experience, located 
1. On this reading of Descartes, see Boulboullé (2013).
2. An Inquiry into Modes of Existence (AIME) is a book and part of a web project (AIME 
project), including three books: a digital book (printable) at the launch; this book 
(Latour 2013a); and one that will accompany an August 2014 exhibition. The project has 
three phases: Latour’s conception; a Reaction Environment with trained “co-enquirers” 
closely moderating, filtering, and shaping inputs from anyone who registers to partici-
pate (a Wikipedia sort of model); and a final completed presentation.
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elsewhere, in the play or gaps among terms of reference; in the gestural, the self-
reflexive, the deixical, and the pronominal (as Latour stresses); in the cascades, 
the khora (the Heraclitan swerves and spacings of atoms). Thus in Heidegger 
([1929] 1962) and Sartre ([1943] 1956) we get the splittings between Being and 
Time (Sein und Zeit), Being and Nothingness (L’Être et le néant), while in the 
human geographer Ratzel (1869) we get that between Being and Becoming (Sein 
und Werden). 
This of course leads to questions of method, and that moment in Western phi-
losophy of Hegel’s writings on logic, which Fredric Jameson (2013) points out was 
in its time a mathematical innovation preceding modern Boolean symbolic logic 
(1847; Hegel died in 1831) and was presented by Hegel in terms of a triad Sein, 
Wesen, Begriff, badly translated in English as if they were substantives as Being, 
Essence, and Concept. But, for instance, Begriff, the last, is composed only as a kind 
of culmination and thus future-anterior of itself, while Sein and Wesen play out in 
ever expanding series on their various Moments (punning in German on der Mo-
ment, a temporal notion, and das Moment, an aspectival or perspectival notion). 
Sein and Wesen, then, are a play, back and forth, fort–da, between everyday life and 
the categories and relations that inform it. “The onto-logical,” Derrida says thus, 
“can always be reread or rewritten as a logic of loss or as one of unchecked expense 
(dépense sans réserve)” (Derrida [1967] 1978: 188).
So, what would it mean for an anthropologist—whose daily work is among the 
experiential, linguistic, structural, and institutional play of actually existing human 
beings and their interactions with their human and nonhuman companion spe-
cies, ecologies, embodiments, and cultural semioses—to not just inquire into local 
metaphysics and cosmologies—fragmented, implicit, or located in the future-ante-
riors and relationalities of terms and concepts of local worlds and languages—but 
also to attempt to fix these in global or universal categories as constructions of the 
anthropologist’s own metaphysics? 
We have before us today two versions of this somewhat quixotic effort: the 
one, Descola’s book Beyond nature and culture ([2006] 2013), attempts to recap-
ture schemas of fourfold cosmological differences that existed before the Moderns 
came into disciplinary being (à la Foucault) in the seventeenth century, but with 
roots back to (who else?) the Greeks, thus collapsing the West and the Modern 
into a common naturalism, which, when all is said and done, Descola himself 
claims as inescapably his own. The other version, Latour’s An inquiry into modes 
of existence (2013a), on the one hand contemplates multiplicities of twelve to fif-
teen language games, and, on the other hand, insists that at least two of these 
are beyond linguistic worlds, even though including words, incommensurable 
and untranslatable beyond themselves: love and religious speech. Empedocles, of 
course, long ago, in his poem “Purifications,” versified about love and strife as the 
two forces that bring together or separate the four elements into the things of our 
empirical worlds.3 
3. A Sicilian Greek philosopher reportedly able to cure disease and old age, avert epidem-
ics and storms. 
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Love and strife: White mythology and Graceland
Latour’s parable of the Moderns, the Whites, the Europeans, and the Evil Genius 
or serpent Double-Click is a Moebius-strip-like variant on Derrida’s essay “White 
mythology” ([1972] 1982). The Whites are a coin whose inscription is worn away 
by use until what once was a vibrant living metaphor becomes just a dead, unat-
tended-to token, whited out, white inscription on white coin. Or as Derrida says, 
“[M]etaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced it, the 
scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an in-
visible design, covered over in the palimpsest” ([1972] 1982: 213). Latour’s vibrant 
use of metaphor tries to undo the deadening of the Whites and the whitening out. 
AIME is formatted as a monologue or monograph, a myth, an Alice in Wonderland 
(Carroll [1865] 1903) picaresque tale, full of the markers of the genre, such as call-
ing everything astonishing, or alternatively expressing exaggerated surprise at the 
obtuseness of the Moderns and the Whites. The book, Latour says, is a “charitable 
fiction” (2013a: 15, original emphasis). It is a how-to manual of instruction for an 
anthropology without human actors. “Humanity is above all,” he says, “the recoil of 
the technological detour” (230, original emphasis). The project calls for collabora-
tion through a website— you too can be enrolled in the website’s categories, a con-
tribution, he suggests, to the digital humanities. The landscape today is of course 
littered with such calls for breathing life into websites gasping for traffic. 
Latour takes his terms, he warns at one point, from information sciences, project 
management, and international legal negotiations, not exactly the most humanistic 
of libraries, but important language games. The project, moreover, he proclaims, 
must be finished by August 2014, a century after the Guns of August of World War 
I. Game over, start again. 
The project is formulated as about prepositions (or pre-positions, linguistic de-
ixic markers of position), and in that sense follows in the footsteps of Wittgenstein’s 
and Lyotard’s language games, Austin’s felicity conditions, and James’ prepositional 
pragmatism. Key to the modes of existence are their activities: verbs such as vibrate 
or dispatch (ibid.: 250), adverbs, gerunds, prepositions, and two forms of deixis 
(apo- and epi-—apodeixis for science or demonstration, and epidexis, or rhetorical 
flourish, for politics). Latour changes nouns into verbal forms, except to create an 
enemy. Society is one of these. He never tries to use the gerund “socializing,” which 
might have lots of trajectories, including enunciatory communities, more or less 
transient/permanent (Fortun 2001). Behind the scenes are cheap points still to be 
scored in favor of Gabriel Tarde against Émile Durkheim (Latour 2007), but mainly 
against social constructivism, the advocates of which Latour once again demolishes 
delightfully along with Heidegger and the philosophers of being-as-being (Latour 
2013a: 220). Both Society and Individual are phantoms, he quips, created like the 
circles drawn in the air at night by children with glow lights that disappear as soon 
as the lights are put down. The metaphor comes in very useful again in Latour’s 
wonderful chapter on politics. 
These little tricks, prepositions, adverbs, and the like, are an origami ontology: 
the ability to create out of folds, lines, and angles quite elaborate structures, revers-
ing the sensibility that structures are the frameworks giving coherence and form 
to parts. Origami was one of the devices used by Lévi-Strauss to model for himself 
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the multidimensional complexities of the transformational topologies of South and 
North American mythologies. We are indebted to Philippe Descola for having this 
origami restored and preserved at the Musée de l’Homme. One of Latour’s bons 
mots is that the whole is not greater than its parts, but, on the contrary, the parts 
are greater than the whole (Latour 2012, 2013a: 420). In an origami sense that may 
be true.4 The backstage ruse-target here again is Durkheim; the frontstage target 
remains social constructivism. 
Actor Network Theory, in this book, has now lost, for better or worse, its actors, 
and is now purely networks, at times with “padding” (Latour’s term), but mainly 
made active, through holes, gaps, and leaps (perhaps even nowadays synapses, 
though I don’t think that word appears in the book’s 488 pages). It’s a double idea 
of passages and constants: networks are composed of heterogeneous elements, and 
something circulates through them, thus they are discontinuous (hiatuses between 
heterogeneous elements) and yet have trajectories and direction, continuous passes 
or passages through alternations and differences. To say something is to say some-
thing differently, to translate, to metamorphose, to metaphorize; but there are con-
stants too: the angles of origami, or the immutable mobiles across maps, photos, 
surveying lines, satellite images, and the ground
Despite the book’s attention to prepositions (Michael Silverstein might say prag-
matics and metapragmatics [e.g. 2003]) and to the tagging of modes of existence 
by three-letter codes (DNA anyone?) which Latour calls object-oriented languages 
(from computer science), what the book claims finally to want to be about is moral-
ity and, evasively but importantly, ecology in the Anthropocene and the sensitive 
Gaia—trembling with extreme weather, climate change, pollution, earthquakes, 
and vulcanism—planet earth on which we (for the moment) live. Latour seems 
convinced (by Peter Sloterdijk [Latour 2008]) that we have only one earth to work 
with, and doesn’t contemplate, as many space scientists and undersea explorers do, 
that we may both have to colonize beyond our current habitats and perhaps even 
evolve our bodies. One thinks of the anthropologist Valerie Olson’s work (2011) on 
NASA’s exploratory preparation for space exploration in extreme environments. 
But at Sciences Po, Latour has actors staging ways to face the emotional and cogni-
tive challenges of an apocalyptic collapse of Gaia, not unlike the apocalyptic futur-
ism of the Paraguayan Ayereo.
If we consider Latour’s book a kind of encyclopedic novel, that is, a text that at-
tempts to register the European world of knowledge at the moment (like Finnegans 
wake [Joyce 1939], or Gravity’s rainbow [Pynchon 1973]), we can understand why 
there are few references but many well-known phrasings, and more importantly 
it gives us a rationale for why some corrections might be of little consequence, 
while others might be more consequential. When Latour asserts that, “Strangely 
enough, in the history of anthropology there haven’t been any ‘first contacts’ with 
the Whites” (2013a: 478), one wants to say, but what about all those volumes on the 
Whites that came out of cultural studies and anthropology from Santa Cruz and 
elsewhere in the 1990s? But perhaps that’s just additional bibliography. Similarly 
4. Latour (2013c) describes Gaia as not a sphere or globe, but a membrane and many his-
torical loops in which humans are cocooned, as in threads of silk, as their conditions of 
existence.
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there is the odd suggestion (173) that we need a museum for the Whites, when 
surely we have a surfeit of those. When Latour writes that we only know the moral 
“when we feel tormented by a moral scruple. Nothing changes, and yet everything 
changes” (459), we feel ourselves immediately in a Durkheimian world (Durkheim 
1915), and elsewhere he insists, like Durkheim or George Herbert Mead (1934), 
on the self as being through others; but here he wants to take the thought in the 
direction of starting over, the reprise—did I do the right thing, can we run it again? 
That’s the moral struggle. 
Although I might go along with much of Latour’s sensibility about morality and 
religion, and the importance of the activity of reprise, of always starting over, re-
evaluating, I do not recognize this as dominant in the historical record, but rather a 
fragile thread of tolerant metaphorical and interpretive play. Indeed the lack of top-
ics such as warfare5 and the integration of former enemies, mental illness and poi-
sonous knowledge, widening inequalities and the now shifting transnational forces 
of hegemony, make this text one of benign neglect, although in one pithy sentence 
Latour does point out gleefully, “Anyone who accepts the Moderns’ claim to have 
had, at least, the immense merit of having done away with the taste for human 
sacrifice must not follow the news very closely, and must know very little about 
twentieth-century history” (2013a: 169). “Gotcha.” One wonders if he has in mind 
Steven Pinker’s The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined (2011).
Like all multidimensional and tabular systems (one thinks of Talcott Parsons 
[e.g. 1951] or Niklas Luhmann [e.g. [1984] 1995]), everything can be accommo-
dated, which, however, is not to say that everything is of focal attention. Ecology 
and Gaia are words that come up as ways of the future, but only in Latour’s Gifford 
Lectures (2013c) do they receive focal attention. In one brilliant ethnographic de-
tail, Latour does note in passing that European vultures have learned to eat fresh 
meat, ever since the European Commission passed a degree forbidding sheep herd-
ers from leaving dead sheep in the fields for them. 
Gaia and the Anthropocene— R.U. Sirius? I joke, but Latour points out that 
the term in French for “the view from nowhere” is le point de vue de Sirius, a view 
he and anthropologists in general have argued we cannot afford. He puts on the 
table two important projects that many of us in anthropology are already trying to 
join together: the first is what I have called (2003, 2009), after Wittgenstein (1953), 
nurturing emergent forms of life involving biological and ecological sensibilities; and 
what Latour calls (2013a), after Étienne Souriau (1943), “modes of existence.” The 
second has to do with a kind of diplomacy (Latour’s term): Can comparative an-
thropology provide us with credible tools for planetary negotiations among the 
vernaculars and forms of life that matter (a question taken up empirically for cli-
mate change by Candis Callison [2014], and for living with toxicity by Kim Fortun 
[2001])? In the book, he is still unable to say more than that we experience a double 
displacement from economy to ecology, “the first is uninhabitable and the second 
not yet ready for us!” (Latour 2013a: 23).
Yet, what Latour has to say about the modes of existence of the law, science, 
politics, religion, and economics is worth attention; as are his general rhetorical 
5. Warfare at an abstract and political philosophy level under conditions of Gaia’s turbu-
lence is the subject of his fifth Gifford Lecture.
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strategies of inversion, paradox, and analogical ruses to make a point. Each of the 
modes of existence is defined by three criteria: (1) the right pre-position, (2) a dis-
continuity from other language games, and (3) felicity conditions. These constitute 
each language game’s own form of veridication. One can tell one is speaking in the 
wrong language game when there is a category mistake bearing on one of the felic-
ity conditions. 
Of the twelve to fifteen language games Latour sketches, I want to draw atten-
tion to the five or six I think most delightful and instructive, and the most worked 
out: economics, law, politics, science, and religion (and not in the book: ecology). 
For me this is the core of Latour’s book, and is what will be useful for the class-
room when discussing the ideas of Wittgenstein, Austin, Lyotard, James, Walter 
Lippmann (1925), or John Dewey (1927). 
Economics
Latour repeats the Maussian and Polanyian themes (Mauss [1925] 1967; Polanyi 
1944) the disembedding of the economy is never complete, and what is at stake in 
the economy is never objective knowledge, but “attachment, organization, distribu-
tion and morality” (Latour 2013a: 464). He says had economics started with these 
anthropological questions, “it would have become a great science of passions and 
interests . . . coextensive with anthropology or the history of exchange” (ibid.). But 
that is precisely where Adam Smith (1759) started, with passions and moral senti-
ments. Thomas Malthus (1803), Mauss ([1925] 1967), and Polanyi (1944) followed, 
and then in 1964 Gary Becker, as Foucault ([1979] 2008) reminds us, followed with 
human capital calculations of American neoliberals that reshaped the passions of 
the individual into commodified, educationally calculated, and selfentrepreneur-
ialized forms. Following on many anthropological accounts, Latour delightfully 
summarizes: “Everything here is hot, violent, active, rhythmic, contradictory, rapid, 
discontinuous, pounded out—but these immense boiling cauldrons are described 
to you (in economics and management speak) as the icy-cold, rational, coherent, 
and continuous manifestation of the calculation of interests” (2013a: 376); and the 
public square “appears to be . . . entirely emptied of all its protagonists”; “only the 
incontrovertible result of unchallengeable deductions made elsewhere” (ibid.). And 
“[o]rganizational consultants, ‘coaches,’ managers, and ‘downsizers’ earn small for-
tunes by tracking down the multitude of ‘contradictory injunctions’ that pull the 
participants in contradictory directions” (396). “Arrangements of calculation never 
had the goal of knowing objectively, but made it possible to express preferences, to 
establish quittances, trace ends, settle accounts, set limits to what would otherwise 
be limitless and endless, offer instruments to those who must distribute means and 
ends” (465).
The law
It is with the law that Latour is most clear about the constitution of a mode of 
existence that is self-contained and where he is able to identify quasi-subjects and 
quasi-objects most sharply. “When lawyers are asked to define what they do, they 
string together long sentences in which they unfailingly use the adjective ‘legal’ 
to qualify everything they say” (ibid.: 359); “is there a legal means? . . . this means 
won’t get us anywhere” (38, original emphasis). Like Max Weber on rationalities, 
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Latour notes, “One can complain about the law that it is formal, arbitrary, con-
structed but not that it is irrational” (59). He quotes H. L. A. Hart (who sounds 
like he stepped out of one of Annelise Riles’ books [1996, 2011], or indeed like 
Secretary of State John Kerry arriving in Geneva for negotiations over Iran’s nuclear 
programs on November 10, 2013, saying he had crafted texts, all prepared ahead of 
time, with “bracketed language,” i.e. the spaces between brackets, open to adjust-
ment): “[R]ules of law provide individuals (or representatives of countries) with the 
means to fulfill their intentions, by endowing them with the legal power to create, 
through determined procedures and in certain conditions, structures of rights and 
duties” (2013a: 359, original emphasis). The law, religion, and politics all produce 
what Latour calls quasi-subjects, or Foucault (1975) or Althusser (1970) would 
call positions of subjectivation and interpolation. It is an admirable feature, Latour 
argues, that these “allow us never to begin with acting, thinking, speaking human 
beings, capable of creating technologies, imaging works, or producing objective 
knowledge”. (2013a: 372, original emphasis). “Humanoids become humans by dint 
of association with the beings of technology, fiction, and reference; they became 
skillful, imaginative, capable of objective knowledge by grappling with these modes 
of existence (language games, or Ernst Cassirer’s ‘symbolic forms’ ([1923] 1953) 
which externalize and articulate thought)” (372). Hence they are quasi-objects that 
provide offers of subjectivity to quasi-subjects which come to fill the still empty 
form of the implicit enunciator (ibid.). 
Politics
Latour’s method provides the most insight here. For many years, he has been meta-
phorizing the Icelandic Thing or parliament into the trope of the “parliament of 
things,” nonhuman objects and human–nonhuman assemblages that require re-
peated discussions (parliaments) about how they matter: “matters of concern” 
rather than “matters of fact.” At one time, he suggested that the United States was 
too wrapped up in its imperial entanglements to be able to think straight about 
democracy and that Old Europe would provide a more seasoned and pragmatic 
path toward democratic development in the technological age. “But it does not ap-
pear,” he pronounces, “that members of other cultures wish to become citizens of 
a free government—at least as long as they have not redefined the words ‘citizen,’ 
‘freedom,’ and ‘government’ in a thoroughgoing way in their own terms” (Latour 
2013a: 332). One wonders with whom in China or Iran or Brazil he’s been convers-
ing. Indeed “democracy can’t be parachuted in from a US Air Force plane,” a trope 
explored in the Iranian films Secret ballot by Babak Payami and Testing democracy 
by Mohsen Makhmalbaf, but which Latour credits to one of the Whites, a Modern-
who-has-never-been-modern, the European philosopher Peter Sloterdijk. Latour 
says “our ethnographer can stay home in Europe and discover many things” (ibid.). 
I am less convinced that this is all that productive in our pluralistic world. 
But these are quibbles: Latour’s real message, brilliantly laid out, is that speak-
ing politically is a matter of Circles, a kind of Nietzschean Eternal Recurrence 
(Nietzsche [1885] 1917), “Speak publicly in such a way that you will be ready to 
run through the entire circle, coming and going, and to obtain nothing without 
starting over again; and never to start again without seeking to extend the circle” 
(Latour 2013a: 349). Unlike economics, which empties the agora, political speech 
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refills it. Unlike economics, which turns down the heat of action to the coldness 
of calculation in order to effect distribution and call arguments to quits, political 
speech and the activity of moral-bearing beings engage in the violence and chaos 
of the agora over and over. It is in this mode of existence that the public is created 
phantasmatically by a continual reprise, like the metaphor of the circles and shapes 
created by the child with the flaming stick as long as the stick keeps moving (352). 
It is an ephemeral achievement when the crowd of many opinions and interests 
and passions can unify and come to a consensus only to turn back from unity to 
multiplicity and have to start again. 
“If Callicles set out to judge Socrates’s geometric proof by the yardstick of the 
Circle, he will misinterpret it as surely as if Socrates claims to be teaching Callicles 
the art of speaking straight to an angry crowd” (ibid.: 349). They are different lo-
goi, appropriate to different language games, different modes of existence, different 
forms of life. Politics is always “object-oriented” (Latour nods toward the vocabulary 
of what he calls the information sciences, but this is more specifically a term from 
programming languages like Java). Yet politics escapes that “aberration called politi-
cal science,” a field Latour skewers as an effort “to replace the overheated blood of 
the body politics with one of those frozen liquids that quickly change into solids and 
allow the ‘plastination’ of corpses offered to the admiration of the gawkers accord-
ing to the modus operandi of the sinister doctor Gunther von Hagens” (335).6 He 
comments, “Monster metaphors are mixed in here on purpose because one cannot 
do political anthropology without confronting questions of teratology,” or abnor-
malities (ibid.), and he even slams the Foucauldian term “governance” as sanitized. 
Science 
Science is another mode of existence whose conditions of felicity Latour has long 
been teasing out. Its “proofs,” like “means” in the law, or the predications of religion, 
depend upon “all that is required to maintain scientific facts.” Maintain is the key 
word here. All that is required depends upon networks of heterogeneity. “Scientific 
results do not depend on the humans who nevertheless produced these results” (ibid.: 
71, emphasis added). They depend on chains of reference, populated with fictive 
beings (galaxies, particles, upheavals of mountains, valleys, viruses, DNA) that are 
paper and words that “have to be launched through the world like so many carrier 
pigeons” (250). “No science is possible, especially no abstract science, unless the 
world is populated by these little beings capable of going everywhere, of seeing and 
submitting to the most terrible trials in place of the researcher trapped in her body 
and immobilized in her laboratory. It is these delegates that we have trusted, since 
the seventeenth century, to go off and travel everywhere . . . and bring back refer-
ences . . . across the . . . cascade of INSCRIPTIONS, ideographs . . .” (251, emphasis 
in the original, capitals and bold in the original as a crossing). This aphoristic in-
version—arguing that it is fictions which travel on scientific expeditions (not scien-
tists)—is delightful and amusing, but not much of an improvement upon models, 
hypotheses, measurements, and the other paraphernalia of ordinary science talk; 
and incidentally it short-changes the field scientist who is not “immobilized in her 
laboratory,” such as the anthropologist. Of course they are “characters” and they 
6. Is Vesalius for his public dissections (and Descartes) equally sinister? 
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are “made”; you and I are characters too, and we make up ourselves and each other 
as we go along. The device here is to shift the verb of action to devices and stories, 
away from people. 
Religion 
Religion becomes central to Latour’s project of looking for morality-bearing quasi-
subjects and quasi-objects. He searches for the enchantments that he, like so many 
Moderns, claim are in danger of being lost. He began, he says, as a militant Catholic 
student of theology, did a Ph.D. in Theology, and today is embarrassed to talk, even 
to his family, about why he likes to go to church. I certainly can identify with his 
vision for tolerant forms of speaking religiously; his stress on the power of a loving 
word, on going to Lourdes not for a cure, but for conversion to a spirit of caring for 
others. Speaking religiously, paradoxically, must express both fidelity to the past 
and innovation to stay relevant. Latour condemns literalism, fundamentalism, and 
claims of religion to be both inerrant and clear in meaning. “Etymology attests to 
this: religion is the relationship among or, better still, the relativism of interpreta-
tions” (Latour 2013a: 313, emphasis in the original). One wishes the Church had 
recognized this during the Inquisition. 
Some of Latour’s grammatical felicity conditions here work well: “[S]peaking 
‘morally’ engages one in an entirely different way from speaking about moral prob-
lems; again the adverb leads to a different proposition from one associated with the 
corresponding domain” (ibid.: 459, original emphasis). Infelicity in this mode is sus-
pension of the reprise. Thus to say, “‘What’s the point in being moral, since I’m saved,’ 
… is betraying religion and morality” (460). “[W]hat happens to us when we feel 
tormented by a moral scruple. Nothing changes, and yet everything changes” (458). 
And yet there are problems. Latour has written several essays exploring this 
mode of existence. “In thou shall not freeze-frame,” he expertly picks apart three 
Catholic paintings to demonstrate that they do not naïvely depict miracles, divine 
messages, or resurrection, but are allegories of the hide and seek of presence and 
salvation. They are intended to instill a transformation in the listener and speaker, 
bringing the good news of agape, turning away from the distant objects of the world 
to the presence of salvation in the world. Religious speech acts are like “l love you,” a 
heart-stopping tiny time-shift that changes a relationship when judged true (Latour 
2011: 102) and can as easily be reversed by a false move, word, or gesture (104). 
Oddly, however, this leads Latour to claim that “there is no point of view from 
which one could compare different religions and still be talking in religious fashion” 
(ibid.: 101). So much for the many parables exchanged across religions along the 
Silk Road among Muslim Sufi, Christian monk, Hindu pandit, Buddhist and Jain 
monk, and Confucian sage; so much for the borrowings across scholastic traditions 
of just the kinds of deconstruction and redirection of attention to rhetoric, poetics, 
grammar, dialogues of love, metaphors, and pragmatics and attention to paint-
ings, chants, ritual, and passion plays that Latour rediscovers. Above all, Latour’s 
claims for the self-enclosedness of religious speech are unduly pessimistic about 
precisely the pluralist worlds that we inhabit. I have no difficulty, myself, engaging 
in mourning processions for Imam Hussain, beating my chest rhythmically to the 
chanting; or indeed getting into the cadences and imagery of the call-and-response 
of a good Southern Baptist-style sermon—even though I do not accept the doxa 
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that often accompany either, and indeed worry about the negative crowd effects 
and other negative political consequences they often generate, just as I worry about 
the often fanatical religious lives in which Latour’s Catholic paintings participated.
More generally, I worry about the seeming tendency of both Latour and Descola 
(in their different ways) to interpret Christian beliefs and practices generously, but 
to ascribe to others an inability to deploy metaphor and allegory as philosophically 
and with equal self-awareness. (We speak religiously; they have ontologies.) 
Latour’s lyrical book Rejoicing: Or the torments of religious speech ([2002] 
2013), for instance, is grounded in Catholicism, with a Protestant lament about 
aloneness in the world and anxiety about the reduction of the sensuality of the 
Church’s rituals to the instabilities of the Word. At times there is even a Jewish 
Talmudic renewal of the word, although Latour rejects “the high price of exegesis 
… the constraints of erudition” (56)—precisely that in which the weekly Jewish 
services revel, the drashas and debates, the search always for more and more of 
the infinite meanings of the layered and allusive and deconstructible text, mean-
ings that make sense here and now, for those who read and intepret it as if it is, 
as it is, addressed to them, for they make it so, not always and every time, but 
often enough to come back for more as well as for the sensuous community of the 
rhythmic chanting, swaying, the ritual wine, the food, family, and the honors of 
performing a portion. 
Latour’s text begins with the discomforts of doxa, as if unaware of the many 
religions that do not ground themselves in doxa, but in varying degrees and fi-
delity to orthopraxis (hold the theology). Latour models his account of religious 
speech on that of lovers coming through a quarrel and rediscovering their love. 
Love needs to be directly addressed: no good telling her that you already told 
her last year you loved her; and certainly no good to go into the etymology of 
the words for love. There are at least four of these felicity conditions, and five 
infelicity conditions of false religious speech. Religion has to do with conversion 
of distance into closeness, with a hoisting of the sling of love (a kind of bootstrap-
ping) from lovers “alone in the world” and aggregates of strangers into something 
like a holy people. “In religion,” Latour says (ignoring the Qur’an) punning “you 
don’t find any directly addressed speech—any more than, in the sciences, you find 
clear utterances that aren’t heavily rigged” ([2002]: 2013: 83). (Rigging can be the 
supports of the ship’s sails, or the set-ups that ensure an outcome rather than sur-
prises: scaffolding or corruption.) In a lovely passage, Latour revels in St. Mark’s 
Gospel, but pays no attention to its parables, rather suggesting a kind of structural 
analysis in columns (like Lévi-Strauss’ [1967] “The story of Asdiwal”): tags, rup-
tures, violent reactions, incomprehension, cautions, and refocusing. Thus the text 
provides models of and models for the stutterings (a Mosaic trope) of religious 
understanding and speech. In a Levinasian mode, Latour remarks, “‘God is no-
body’ sounds strange to our ears,” but it would not be “shocking … either for the 
faithful or for the unfaithful … to say: ‘The thing that turns us into individuals 
who are close and present might well, in certain places and certain times, have 
been called God but we could also, today, just as easily call it by another voca-
ble, such as ‘The thing that begets neighbors’” ([2002] 2013: 135)—what Levinas 
might call the trace of the divine present in the face of the other (Levinas [1972] 
2003, [1974] 1978) 
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Ecology, Gaia, and the Anthropocene 
These terms only get passing mention in the book An inquiry into modes of exis-
tence, but are the focus of Latour’s recent Gifford Lectures, Facing Gaia: Six lectures 
on the political theology of nature (2013c). “The central aim of the (AIME) project 
is to save the planet,” Latour has claimed (2013b). Gaia is the immunological reac-
tion of the earth forcing us to move from viewing “nature as implicit conditions of 
existence to fully explicitated [sic] conditions of existence.” Recalling Michel Serres’ 
([1990] 1995) notion of natural contracts, like legal contracts, contracting, limiting, 
and expanding relationships and networks, Latour (2013b) speaks of reworking 
social contracts with Gaia. Gaia is now a summoning entity as the gods used to 
be, requiring new rituals and a “new political body yet to emerge.” The earth has 
been placed into a “state of exception” (Schmitt [1922] 2005), or a radicalized “risk 
society” (Beck [1986] 1992), “obliging everyone to make decisions because of the 
extremes of life and death.” With his eye for rhetorical inversion, Latour says “pri-
mary qualities” (nature, objective reality, Gaia) are being now marked by sensitiv-
ity, agency, reaction, uncertainty; while the secondary qualities of human interpre-
tive capacities and emotions are marked by indifference, insensibility, numbness. 
Although Gaia is in a “feverish form of palsy, falling catastrophically from tipping 
point to tipping point in a rhythm that frightens climatologists even more with the 
publication of each new data set” (Latour 2013c: 80), our human emotions are not 
matched. Unlike the urgency and speed with which the arms race in the Cold War 
was able to be drummed up, the politics of climate change is languid (ibid.: 113). 
Here Latour turns dramatically Durkheimian, calling on apocalyptic prophecy, 
playwrights, curators, and composers to create rituals for survival. The Circles of 
politics are enhanced where climate skeptics show how much ways of life are threat-
ened, whose interests conflict with whose. The membrane and loops of Gaia in 
which humans are cocooned must be kept “traceable and publically visible or else 
we will be blind and helpless” (ibid.: 95). Gaia is not a publicly, but “is a tiny mem-
brane, no more than a few kilometres thick . . . not made of loops in the cybernetic 
sense of the metaphor, but in the sense of historical events expanding,” and under-
standing the contradictory and conflicting connections “can only be accomplished 
by crisscrossing their potential paths with as many instruments as possible” (ibid.).
The lyricism is not unlike that of Davi Kopenawa’s speech to us from the Amazon 
(Kopenawa and Albert 2013). Let us turn then to Descola’s view from the Achuar 
([1986] 1994, [1993] 1996, 2006 [2013]), and his claim (2006 [2013]) that cosmolo-
gies can be typed into four ontologies and seven plus seven modes (of which he 
chooses to elaborate only on two; although by the Epilogue the two have become 
four modes of identification, and six modes of relation). It is much easier to keep 
track of the geographical instantiations. Using Latour’s notion of language games 
and their conditions of felicity, we might ask to whom the typology is addressed, 
or for what purpose. It is somewhat of an anticlimax after four hundred pages to 
be told by Descola that his aim is merely to propose an account of diversity, and 
that it is a mistake to think that the Indians of Amazonia, the Australian Aborigi-
nes, or the monks of Tibet can bring us a deeper wisdom, and that he forswears 
both nostalgia and wishful thinking. Good grief, then, what’s the point? At least we 
should be making friends (Fischer 2014). This aside, we can assume a point of view 
from the Achuar as a reference for contrasts both within the region against other 
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so-called animist cosmologies and across regions with analogism, naturalism, and 
totemisms.
Seeing through Achuar eyes 
Descola’s efforts to chart Siberian and North American groups on a north–south 
historical gradient from animism to analogism, and Amazonian cultural groups as 
transformational sets of animism, are a thought-provoking, if, I think, not entirely 
successful or comprehensive, revival of comparativism in the human geography 
tradition correlating habitats and mythologies/cosmologies. Insofar as they tenu-
ously connect to Latour’s project, it is through the work of wide-mesh network-
ing of human and nonhuman through cosmo-logical modes and relations. Latour, 
however, explicitly eschews direct concern with non-Europeans in the AIME 
project (Karlsruhe) to focus (a) on the central institutions of modernity (à la the 
1986 call of Anthropology as cultural critique, though that was inclusive of non-
Europeans [Marcus and Fischer 1986]), as well as (b) one of many calls to explore 
digital platforms as media for emerging, “digital humanities.”
When Descola wrote In the society of nature ([1986] 1994), he tells us, he strug-
gled to free himself of the abstractions of Althusser, and wrote in a structural-
marxist Godelierian frame of “domestic economy” (Godelier [1966] 1973) filled 
with underexploited premarket forces of production, one of the original “societ-
ies of affluence” (quoting Marshall Sahlins [1972]). Lévi-Strauss was a savior from 
Althusser. References to him are mainly to ecological features in the land and my-
thology, and to trade and exchange relations. 
In Beyond nature and culture ([2006] 2013), instead of Althusser, Descola me-
tabolizes Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s advocacy for a special kind of perspectivist 
cosmology of predation, cannibalism, and reincarnation as protypical of lowland 
Amazonia, one that inverts the Western or Modern model of nature and culture. 
Nature here is the variable and culture the constant: animals are people too, and 
have their own communities and shamans, inverting European claims that jaguars 
are not persons. Descola implicitly contests Viveiros de Castro’s multinaturalism–
monoculturalism and cosmology of predation by showing contrasts among Jivaro, 
Arawak-speaking Campas, Tukano, especially the eastern Tukano, who marry 
(rather than steal) speakers of other languages (studied by my MIT colleague Jean 
Jackson [1983]), and especially the Matsiguena, who have institutionalized the 
elimination of dissent, including oral jousts ending in self-beating immediately 
imitated by one’s jousting opponent. Still, Descola describes the Achuar, follow-
ing the multinaturalist–monocultural doxa, as predators, and even asserts socio-
biologically that predation is deeply wired into human phylogeny. Achuar must 
incorporate whatever is other in order to make themselves complete. Eating your 
enemies, stealing women, and so on, thus, is not really fierce or violent but onto-
logically felicitious. The animals that we eat are our affines; the plants that we grow 
are our children, although Achuar know the difference: women do not give literal 
birth to plants, they just talk to them. Insects are not persons to the Achuar; and 
complete persons are those who have language, that is, humans. So there is a dual-
ism, a nature–culture divide, if one must, albeit perhaps slightly differently drawn. 
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4 (1): 331–355
345 The lightness of existence
The insistence along with Latour that only Europeans are dualists and that is the 
original sin of the Modern seems to fall apart. 
 Descola’s adoption of the multinatural–monocultural doxa, I think, undercuts 
his own rich ethnography, for instance the “topological ballet” of Jivaro headhunt-
ing, which in Turner’s liminal ritual fashion is a fusing together of conceptual op-
posites (Turner 1969). “Over twelve months, Jivaro shrunken heads are given a 
unique face modeling the victim’s features; yet ritually they must be generic Jivaro, 
never called by the patronymic . . . face carefully blackened to obliterate the mem-
ory of the patterns painted on it; . . . orifices sewn up, thereby consigning the sense 
organs to an eternal phenomenal amnesia” (Descola [2006] 2013: 340). 
In the dispute between Joanna Overing and her disciples emphasizing altruistic 
mutual production of exchange of persons and generous conviviality, and Viveiros 
de Castro and his disciples emphasizing “generalized predation” as “the proto-
typical modality of relationship in Amerindian cosmologies” (ibid.: 327), Descola 
notes that the Jivaro’s “ceaseless wars were a source of perplexity . . . and a motive 
for anathema” (ibid.). The stakes are high. The effects of assigning the nearby Ya-
nomami the attribute of “the fierce people,” accepting “predation” as the ontological 
mode of animists of the Amazon basin, has had, many anthropologists argue, seri-
ous negative effects on their legal rights, health services, and lives. 
Grammars of the forest of mirrors
The generalized predation and multinaturalism–monoculturalism doxa over-
looks quite a number of things. As Alicida Ramos has pointed out, “perspectiv-
ism bypasses the political reality of interethnic conflict,” and she cites Viveiros de 
Castro’s disciples as producing accounts that make all Amazonian Amerindians 
look the same, “regardless of where they are in the Amazon, what their linguis-
tic affiliation is, and which historical paths they have trodden” (2012: 482).7 The 
Achuar, as Anne Christine Taylor has shown, expanded and then withdrew from 
the effects of rubber tapping, logging, and oil drilling to the relatively isolated 
region that Descola selected for “salvage” anthropological study (Descola’s char-
acterization). But their trade relations with the outside world include dogs, guns, 
salt, and other materials that kept them within history and interactive cosmolo-
gies, as perhaps did the malaria, cholera, measles, and other diseases that affected 
the nearby Yanomami.
7. Viveiros de Castro (n.d.-a) commends Kopenawa’s text with Bruce Albert (2013) as “a 
masterpiece of ‘interethnic politics,’” cosmological narration “doubl[ing] as an indignant 
and proud claim for the Yanomami people’s right to exist.” He acknowledges histories 
of movement, warfare, conversion, disease and epidemics in passing. “Anthropocenog-
raphy” is also about the ecological devastation in the Amazon especially for the move-
ment of small bands of hunter-gardener-fishermen. But these are not the central focus 
as Viveiros de Castro pursues the meanings of what was happening in his exquisitely 
described nights among the Arawete when one and then other shamans would begin 
their lonely, haunting songs till dawn. 
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Although Descola adopts much of the perspectivist insistence on predation and 
cannibalism as the medium of interaction between humans and nonhumans, hu-
mans and humans, and spirits and animals, he does not fall into its unifying trap, 
nor does Viveiros de Castro’s own earlier ethnographic work on the Arawete of 
the Tupi-Guarani (1992), when he sketched a contrast with Ge social organization 
and cosmology. Descola ([2006] 2013) does not discuss the Tupi-Guarani and Ge 
contrast in his survey, nor the other features of contrastive linguistics across groups 
bearing on their cosmologies. Instead, he is concerned to separate off Amazonian 
thought from that of totemism in Australia, because he thinks Lévi-Strauss con-
flated Amazonian and Australian modes of identification and relation. 
In “The forest of mirrors,” Viveiros de Castro (n.d.-a) makes a lovely start both 
in analyzing Davi Kopenawa’s rhetoric, and in the comparative linguistics among 
indigenous Amazonians (implicitly demonstrating that nature/culture is only 
one of many dynamic oppositions by which, for instance, animals good to eat are 
distinguished from those which are not8). I think he is mistaken to essentialize 
Kopenawa’s mythopoetics as something entirely different from other mythopoet-
ics, rhetorical forms, inspirational practices, and appreciations of environments. 
Six interesting aporia or switching points are constitutive of Kopenawa’s poetics 
and perhaps are slippages in Viveiros de Castro’s own. 
1. Sources of inspiration: the relation between elixirs (inhaling the hallucinogenic 
powder of the yãkõanahi tree; the cataleptic shock of ingesting massive amounts of 
tobacco) and the phenomenology of light, luminosity, transparency, translucence, 
and revelation of the unseen. In Zoroastrian and Vedic traditions the elixir is called 
haoma/soma, and, as Viveiros de Castro (n.d.-a.) notes, citing Reichel-Dolmatoff 
(1975), while much can be attributed to the biochemical effects of drugs, the vi-
sions themselves are formed through a visual-semiotic process that drugs alone do 
not explain. Visions can be induced by incantation, song, or poetry alone. There is 
an ambiguity in Viveiros de Castro’s recognition of altered states of apprehension 
or consciousness, and his claim that these are the whole of a culture’s ontology or 
sense of reality, as if they, unlike us, experience only one reality. 
2. Translation effects: the relation between Kopenawa’s speech to the international 
stage and his internal shamanic mythopoesis. One is reminded of Marshall Sahlins’ 
brilliant rereading (1972) of Elson Best’s account of the old Maori man’s explana-
tion to the Whites about the spirit of the gift (hau) in terms they would understand, 
namely the spirit of capital. The images he sees, Kopenawa says, are “like the images 
in the mirrors I saw in one of your hotels” (Viveiros de Castro n.d.-a). 
3. Logical operators: mirrors and crystals—in which the refractions are rela-
tions, capacities, and potentialities of multiplicity, and passage among worlds—are 
8. See his review of different Amerindian indigenous language terms glossed by the English 
word “animal” (Viveiros de Castro n.d.-a). Nature, I think (Fischer 2009), is a linguistic 
term meaning both what is ostensible and what escapes—as in: “my nature is myself but 
also that which myself does not control.” A nature/culture distinction is a generative or 
movable linguistic binary, not a substantive one. “Unnatural,” for instance, not “cultural,” 
is the antonymn of “natural.”
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tantalizingly but insufficiently interconnected by Viveiros de Castro with gram-
matical features such as intensifier suffixes (-ri in Yanomami, -kuma in Arawak 
languages), and morphemic particles (-imi) that express diminutive, germinal 
(fathering, as in wot-imi, fish-father), or inspirational features: kernels, seeds, or 
points of origination and regeneration. Viveiros de Castro (n.d.-a.) says, “[T]he 
xapiripë shamanic images are only so many different intensive vibrations or modu-
lations.” Is this different from saying in contemporary science everything is bits and 
atoms, or, in Donna Haraway’s (1997) phrase, “material-semiotic”? They too are 
our ancestors; they too constitute our postdeath remains for reanimation. 
4. Relational operators for interpreting environments and forms of life: the refract-
ing, dividing, multiplying relations of mirrors and crystals remind us of Neoplan-
tonic imagery, a connection Viveiros de Castro (n.d.-a.) himself makes via Plotinus 
and Lévi-Strauss, and that I associate with Henri Corbin’s (1948) effort to connect 
Suhravardi’s alam-e mesal, his own Catholic Latin mundus imaginalis, and a recov-
ery of the “theosophical wisdom” of Zoroastrian rhetorical imagery, the equivalent 
of Kopenawa’s ancestral time. The difference lies in the forest-and-river fishing-
hunting-garden regime of the Amazon versus the steppe-horse-cattle ecology of 
the Central Asian and Iranian plateaus. “The primary dialectic,” says Viveiros de 
Castro, “is between seeing and eating.” 
5. Affects and indexicals: shamanic spirits “index characteristic affects,” says 
Viveiros de Castro (n.d.-a.), but he actually says little about affects. Shamanic spirits, 
he says, are representatives of profusion, not representations of types. Still there are 
distinctive animals like jaguars (a type). He wants to deny them iconic or type sta-
tus, a gesture that Latour (2009) skeptically analogizes to the desire for “bombs” to 
blow up Western thought, to provide an outside to whatever is ascribed to so-called 
Western thought, as if the latter were one thing, or full of collapsed representatives/
representations. In his 1998 article, Viveiros de Castro puts “deixis” in the title, but 
he does little with it. In “The forest of mirrors” (n.d.-a.), he says that “the mythic 
jaguar, to pick an example, is a block of human affects in the shape of a jaguar or a 
block of feline affects in the shape of a human; that the distinction, in any rigorous 
sense, is undecidable, since mythic metamorphosis is an ‘event’ or a heterogenic 
‘becoming’ (an intensive superposition of states).” That last parenthetical phrase, I 
think, may be the important one, but one to which, as a would-be anti-hermeneuti-
cist, he pays little attention. Ironically, he claims in “Anthropocenography” (n.d.-b) 
that Latour is indifferent to the philosophy of language. Latour’s new book should 
put paid to that, and perhaps that book can help Viveiros de Castro work out his 
ideas about the grammars of Amerindian thought. 
6. Multitude of invisibles: can “spirits” be homogenized as precursors-and-the-al-
ready-passed-on-to-be-regenerated? Yanaomami shamanic spirits (xapi-ri-pë) are 
only one (type?) of the yai thëpë (invisibles), which include specters of the dead 
(porepë) and malefic beings (në wãripë). The invisibles are not always beautiful, 
diaphanous, or transparent light; they can be monstrous. Indeed, “the imaginary 
of Amazonian spirits relishes constructing corporally deformed invisible species, 
with inverted members, inexistent articulations, minuscule or gigantic appendices, 
atrophied sensorial interfaces, etc.” (Viveiros de Castro n.d.-a.).
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Viveiros de Castro has grafted his work onto the speculative realism, the so-called 
“ontological turn,” of Quentin Meillassoux ([2006] 2008). As Viveiros de Castro ex-
plains, Meillassoux engages in the logic games of trying to think “the ancestral” (re-
ality anterior to any life on earth) and “externality” (beyond what we can know or 
conceive).9 Latour will do this more trenchantly, using Gaia within human experience.
Descola is not ignorant of the history of the moving frontiers of Amazonia: he 
gives hints, and his wife, Anne Christine Taylor (1999), has elegantly outlined what 
we know from the early sixteenth to early nineteenth centuries. She points out that 
settlement patterns, crossethnic alliances, and multiethnic-linguistic tribal forma-
tions (as in the Vaupes studied by Jean Jackson [1983]) all were responses to colo-
nial frontiers first of the Inca and then the Spanish and Portuguese. But there seems 
little place in Descola’s book for the contrasts that, for instance, Eduardo Kohn 
finds between meat-eating predators with teeth, and aroma or life-and-breath-in-
haling predators without teeth such as anteaters, armadillos, and anacondas. Kohn 
elaborates a language of attraction and seduction by anacondas and whiplash bee-
tles; a semen-soul economy that can turn predators into prey, including husbands 
of pregnant women used as bait for white-lipped peccaries; and love charms (2013: 
119–25), that is, a poetics, not an ontology.
The problem is that these debates about the so-called “ontological turn” are pur-
sued entirely in Western vocabulary and inferences, at a level of abstraction that 
rarely deals with the ethnographic material in its own language games that would 
provide the grounds to know how and where the Western words lead astray, as 
translation inevitably does. These are old methodological issues in anthropology 
(not tearing things out of context, always tracing back to the linguistic forms being 
used in the original contexts), and it is disturbing to see them violated in the name 
of abstractions called “diversity.” 
Conclusions 
1. “Ontology” is probably not a useful term for the tasks it is being asked to do, 
and, in any case, at issue, for both Latour and Descola, are ontologies in the plu-
ral. Pluralization allows technologization (object-oriented tagging, pivot tables, 
digitalization), but also seems to empty the meaning of the term(s), making it just 
what Humpty Dumpty decides it should be. Language games have more weight, 
more institutionalized force, more friction, generated by social miscues, mistakes, 
conflicts, protests, and social mobilizations. Language games also link into a dif-
ferent intellectual genealogy than ontology, one that is pragmatic and one that 
9. Viveiros (n.d.-b) connects his interpretation of Amerindian cosmology to Meillassoux’s 
work, and, less convincingly, to Chakrabarty’s “The climate of history: Four theses” 
(2009). Thorne (2011) argues that Meillassoux’s linguistic gambits are largely a recircu-
lating of eighteenth-century apocalyptic discourse. The frequency of the term “God” in 
recent French philosophy is culturally interesting. Chakrabarty, by contrast, is interested 
in human agency, “the geological agency human beings (have been gaining)” and its 
threat to writing history as the growth of human freedom. This reverses Latour’s interest 
in coding human agency as always already nonhuman.
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unclicks deadening, or no longer useful, double-clicks. In An inquiry into modes 
of existence (AIME), Latour (2013a) turns toward Wittgensteinian or Lyotardian 
language games, and Silversteinian deixis and metapragmatics, as formal means of 
distinquishing modern European discursive categories and institutions such as law, 
politics, religion, economics, religion. Each of these “modes of existence” is defined 
by three criteria: (1) the right pre-position, (2) a discontinuity from other language 
games, and (3) felicity conditions.
2. Sustained antihumanism, and/or the rhetoric of inversion, can be fun as prov-
ocation—“[i]magination is never the source but rather the receptacle of beings of 
fiction”; “[h]umanity is … the recoil of the technological detour” (Latour 2013a: 
246, 230, emphasis in original)—but is less what we need than a new humanistic 
politics, open also to the posthuman with its human components, the cyberhuman, 
and companion species, that will allow us to survive, to live after whatever catastro-
phes lie in store—climate change, space travel, bodily evolution, farming the Arctic 
as it warms—and that will counter the widening inequalities and devastations of 
our current cannibal economies, consuming the lives of some for the luxury of 
others. In his Gifford Lectures on Gaia, Latour (2013c) turns to a politics of the 
Anthropocene. In Karlsruhe, Latour (2013b) suggested photography can make vis-
ible how the projections of modernism elide or misrepresent the realities of their 
production, exposing the blinders of a universal view from nowhere (le point de vue 
de Sirius). Under the demands of Gaia, Latour’s claims for Tarde against Durkheim 
(e.g. Latour 2007) may be lessening. His earlier claims for Tarde are premised on the 
technology of profiling and identification (tools he analyzes as essential to current 
amok capitalism), which misses the point of Durkheim’s matters of concern—how 
moral codes and feelings of obligation materialize in rituals, politics, and symbolic 
forms (a central matter of concern in Latour’s recent Gifford lectures on Gaia). 
For all the talk of the nonhuman, Latour, Descola, and Viveiros de Castro remain 
within metaphors, icons, and even onomatopoetics of human languages and semi-
otic systems. In the Gifford Lectures, a metaphorics of immunology reigns, nature 
becomes Gaia, and the human is replaced with the Earth-Bound (also the name of 
a Mexican–US company that sells organic food). 
3. Descola’s comparativism revives a much needed tradition in human geogra-
phy, but needs to be able to accommodate a much wider range of empirical and 
dialogical cases for his schemas to have the logical exhaustiveness he claims: for 
example, Jain notions of multiple souls in onions and other root crops; or Victo-
rian animistic lenses through which scholars such as Mary Boyce (e.g. 1979) inter-
preted the religion of others, in her case, Zoroastrianism, insisting on turning the 
amshaspands (structured six metaphorical attributes of the cosmic forces of good, 
like the seven to ten Vedic prajapatis, or ten sephirot in Jewish mysticism, or the 
mistranslations of Begriff, Sein, und Wesen) into merely personified immortals (but 
see Fischer 1973, 2003). The implicit sense that comparative religion is Christian or 
Christian modern seems characteristic, oddly, of French philosophy these days. In 
Latour’s Gifford Lectures, while still full of Christian references and imagery, this 
cultural specificity is transcended by a politics of mono-geism (no spare planet). 
Latour’s claims about the lack of selfreflexivity of Whites ignores a large literature 
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on Whiteness, and seems perhaps a deflection of current historical crises and top-
ics such as immigration to Europe.
4. Digital humanities as well as visual and performance arts are on the agenda 
everywhere, and Latour, to his credit, has been a fearless early adopter, if not as 
forthcoming about the limitations of his experiments as he might be. I foolishly(?) 
first read An inquiry into modes of existence (AIME) as a book (laboriously taking 
notes, looking for coherent arguments) rather than a flow, an object in motion, a 
deamalgamation, open to recomposition with a few selected and trained coinquir-
ers and redesigners. I assumed that the website was supplementary to the book, 
rather than the reverse (see fn. 2), that its opaque and not very exciting web pres-
ence might not require comparative evaluation with other web projects. A similar 
caution applies to “Actor Network Theory,” which has gradually become a how-to 
manual of instruction for an anthropology without human actors. Latour says he 
has been distancing himself from it, using it only as “cover” while AIME came into 
focus. The world, not just Gaia, and the media of perception are morphing faster 
than response papers can be written. 
5. I’m out of space-time, and can only conclude that the language games of the 
Ayoreo, Achuar, Runa, and others can in fact teach us many things, and that we 
need not Double-Click on any of the identifications made in these two books 
(Descola [2006] 2013; Latour 2013a) without carefully inspecting all the linkages 
for their ruses and deviations, their poetics, and indeed their call that if all the sha-
mans perish, the sky will fall. You must hear me, time is short.
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La légèreté de l’existence et l’origami de l’anthropologie « française »: 
Latour, Descola, Viveiros de Castro, Meillassoux et leur « tournant 
ontologique » 
Latour se tourne vers les jeux de langage de Wittgenstein ou Lyotard, la deixis et 
la métapragmatique de Silverstein, comme moyen formel de distinction des caté-
gories discursives et des institutions européennes modernes, chacune définie par 
trois critères: la juste pré-position, la discontinuité des autres jeux de langage, et 
les conditions de félicité. Le Double Clic et le serpent de la connaissance sont des 
rappels métaphoriques à ne pas effacer le travail d’invention et d’entretien. Dans ses 
conférences sur Gaia Latour se tourne vers une politique durkheimienne de l’an-
thropocène. Descola place les groupes sibériens et nord-américains sur un gradient 
historique nord-sud de l’animisme à l’analogisme et les groupes culturels de l’Ama-
zonie comme des ensembles de transformation animistes, ravivant une tradition de 
la géographie humaine. Il se rattache au projet de Latour par un large maillage de 
réseaux de relations et modes cosmologiques humain–nonhumain, contestant la 
cosmologie de prédation amazonienne uniforme proposée par Viveiros de Castro 
et son multinaturalisme–uniculturalisme, et soutenant plutôt les travaux antérieurs 
sur la linguistique contrastive en Amazonie. Nous n’avons pas besoin de célébrer « 
l’humanité par un détour technologique », mais de se concentrer sur le « peuple-
ment des technologies ».
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